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Regulation of the Human Tissue Industry: A Call for
Fast-Track Regulations
Self-regulation by an industry-dominated accrediting body
will, in our opinion, never be as rigorous nor as aggressive
as Government regulation and consequently will not.., as
effectively protect the patients.
-Steven Anderson, President of Cryolife, before the
Subcommittee on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and
Technology, 103rd Congress, 1993.1
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I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty-three-year-old Brian Lykins arrived at St. Cloud Hospital
in St. Cloud, Minnesota for a routine cartilage transplant to repair a
damaged knee.2 Three days following surgery, Brian was dead.
Scientists from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) later
determined the cause of death to be Clostridium Sordellii, a rare and
toxic bacteria that lives in soil and human intestines.3 The CDC's
investigation traced the source of infection to the donor of the
transplanted tissue-a dead human body.4 The transplanted tissue
was processed by Cryolife, one of the largest human tissue banks in
the United States.
Conventional tissue banks process human tissues from cadavers
and distribute the tissues to surgeons for transplantation.5 These
products serve a crucial role in medicine, and they have the potential
for providing important new therapies.6 The tissue bank industry has
2. What Killed Brian Lykins?, cbsnews.com, May 15, 2002, at
http://www.cbsnews.comstories/2002/05/14/6011/main509045.shtml.
3. Upon death, the bacteria can migrate, usually to warm, anaerobic areas such
as a knee or hip joint. See Clostridia Facts, cbsnews.com, May 15, 2002, at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/ 05/15/60II/main509174.shtml.
4. What Killed Brian Lykins?, supra note 2.
5. While it is illegal to buy or sell an organ for transplantation, reasonable
payments associated with removal, transportation, implantation, processing,
preservation, quality control, and storage of an organ are not prohibited. Human
Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,514, 65,514 (Dec. 14, 1993)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 1270).
6. Tissues processed by conventional tissue banks largely consist of bone,
ligaments, tendons, fascia, cartilage, corneas, and skin that are used in the treatment
of bone disease, orthopedic injuries, ligamentous andjoint complaints, degenerative
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experienced rapid growth over the past two decades. In 1990,
surgeons performed 350,000 tissue transplants.7 Today, more than
800,000 tissues are transplanted every year.8 However, all human
cellular and tissue-based products pose a potential risk of transmitting
communicable diseases because of their nature as derivatives of the
human body.9 The risk of infection can be marginalized if proper
testing and sterilization procedures are followed.0
Although transplantation was generally thought to be a safe and
effective surgical procedure, investigational reports conducted by the
CDC following Brian Lykins' death exposed grave deficiencies
within the tissue industry." Some banks ran multiple tests on
recovered tissue in hopes that the second test would find material
healthy when the first did not;' 2 accepted donors with non-
metastasizing malignant tumors;" and pooled material from multiple
donors, risking contamination of the entire batch." The
investigational report documented fifty-four bacterial infections
resulting from tissue transplants." The death of Brian Lykins
skeletal disease, blindness due to corneal opacification, and bum wounds. Id.
Scientists are hopeful that human tissues may provide therapies for cancer, AIDS,
Parkinson's Disease, Hemophilia, anemia, diabetes, and other serious diseases. See
Food and Drug Administration, Proposed Approach to the Regulation of Cellular
and Tissue-Based Products (Feb. 28, 1997), available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/
gdlns/celltissue.pdf.
7. Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues and the Need for Federal
Regulation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th
Cong. 63 (2003) (statement of Jesse L. Goodman, Director, Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research).
8. Id.
9. Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based
Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,696,52,698 (Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 210, 211, 820, &1271). Known risks include transmission of human
immunodeficiency virus, hepatitis B and C viruses, human T-lymphotropic virus
Type I, rabies, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, syphilis, group B streptococcus, and other
sexually transmitted diseases such as gonorrhea, Chlamydia, Mycoplasma,
Trichomonas, and herpes. Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues, supra
note 7 (statement of Jeanne V. Linden, Director, Blood and Tissue Resources,
Wadsworth Center, New York State Department of Health).
10. See Tissue Banks: The Danger of Tainted Tissues, supra note 7 (statement
of Jesse L. Goodman).
11. See discussion infra Parts HI.A-B, IV.A.
12. FDA Still Lacks Timetable for Tissue Bank Oversight, Blood Weekly, June
5, 2003.
13. See Tissue Banks: Is the Federal Government's Oversight Adequate?:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Valerie J. Rao, M.D.,
Chief Medical Examiner, District Five, Leesburg, Florida).
14. FDA Still Lacks Timetable, supra note 12.
15. Anna Lumelsky, Transplant Tissue: Cryolife Human Soft Tissue Implants
Recalled, 30 J. L. Med. & Ethics 474 (2002).
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combined with the shocking report issued by the CDC left the
question, "How could a medical industr in the United States of
America be allowed to operate like this?'
' 6
Though organs and blood have long been subjected to extensive
FDA oversight, human tissues have fallen between the cracks of
federal regulation. 7 While "normally, when something [is] a matter
of public health and safety, the federal government acts far more
quickly," the implementation of a federal regulatory scheme
governing human tissues has been a lethargic process.1 The FDA
first acknowledged the need for extensive government oversight in its
1993 Interim Rule.' 9 However, the FDA did not propose a
comprehensive regulatory approach to the regulation of human tissues
until February of 1997.20 Still, seven years later, the FDA still has not
finalized all of the proposed regulations.2'
In contrast, other countries have exercised government oversight
over the human tissue industry for many years. Belgium enacted a
comprehensive regulatory system in 1988.2 In 1994, France enacted
16. See Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues, supra note 7 (testimony
of Steve Lykins, father of Brian Lykins).
17. See Human Tissue Intended For Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,514,
65,514 (Dec. 14, 1993).
18. What Killed Brian Lykins?, supra note 2 (quoting Senator Susan Collins).
The FDA has also expressed frustrations regarding the length of time required to
finalize human tissue regulations. Dr. Murray Lumpkin, the Principal Associate
FDA Commissioner, stated, "We ourselves get frustrated with the time. But I think
when you [are] looking at the issue as complex as this is, the different kinds of
tissues we [are] involved with, the evolutionary nature of a very new technology
that [is] coming along, even though five years sounds like a long time, it [is] also
the time to get it right. "Id.
19. Human Tissue Intended For Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,514. The
FDA published the Interim Rule to address an immediate need to protect the public
health from the transmission of HIV infection and hepatitis infection through tissue
transplants. This rule required only minimal testing, and the FDA announced that,
in the near future, more extensive regulations would be proposed regarding
infectious disease control for tissues. See discussion infra Part II.B.
20. See FDA, Proposed Approach, supra note 6.
21. The proposed regulations were published in three parts: 1) establishment
of registration and listing, 2) suitability determination of donors, and 3) current
good tissue practices. At the time of this writing, the "Current Good Tissue
Practices" regulations have not been finalized. The FDA has recently published the
"Eligibility Determination of Donors" final rule, but it will not go into effect until
May 25, 2005. The "Establishment Registration and Listing" regulations, although
finalized on January 19, 2001, did not go into full effect until January 21, 2004 due
to the delays in enacting the other two parts of the regulatory system. See
discussion infra Part II. D.
22. Barbara Indech, The International Harmonization of Human Tissue
Regulation: Regulatory Control Over Human Tissue Use and Tissue Banking In
Select Countries and the Current State of International Harmonization Efforts, 55
Food & Drug L.J. 343, 353 (2000).
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comprehensive regulatory legislation. 23 Even two states-New York
and Florida-have developed comprehensive human tissue programs.
24
The absence of a federal comprehensive regulatory system has
concerned many leaders within the tissue industry as well as members
of Congress. In a hearing before the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee, Chairwoman Susan Collins sharply criticized the FDA
for its failure to exercise any substantial oversight. She stated, "The
FDA still has not kept its commitment to addressing this public health
risk. The result of bureaucratic inertia has been tragedy.
2 6
The FDA presented its comprehensive regulatory plan
approximately seven years ago. The long delay in FDA enactment of
human tissue regulations is illustrative of a serious problem afflicting
all administrative agencies: "ossification" of the rulemaking
process .2' Today, the minimum time period between the proposal of
major regulations and the final enactment is five years. While
ossification affects every administrative agency in the United States
government, it has been particularly detrimental to FDA regulation of
the human tissue industry. This article contends that the dynamic
nature of science and technology requires Congress to consider
implementing a fast-track program for FDA regulations.
Section II will trace the evolution of human tissue regulation.
Section 1Hl will look at recent developments on Capitol Hill
concerning human tissue regulation. Section IV analyzes the threat
of contaminated human tissues and the support for federal oversight.
Section V will discuss the informal rulemaking procedure, noting the
benefits as well as the drawback of the current rulemaking system.
Section VI proposes the creation of a fast-track rulemaking system
that will function to streamline the FDA rulemaking process.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN TISSUE REGULATIONS
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, reports surfaced
concerning the spread of communicable diseases through tissue
transplants. The most infamous report occurred in 1991. Lifenet, a
23. See id. at 355.
24. John J. Zodrow, The Commodification of Human Body Parts: Regulating
the Tissue Bank Industry, 32 Sw. U. L. Rev. 407, 431 (2003).
25. See discussion infra Parts III.A-B, IV.B.
26. FDA Still Lacks Timetable for Tissue Bank Oversight, supra note 12.
27. Professor E. Donald Elliot coined the term "ossification." He used it to
characterize the effects of additional procedural, analytical, and substantive
requirements imposed on the informal rulemaking procedure by the three political
branches. See E. Donald Elliot, Remarks at the Symposium on Assessing the
Environmental Protection Agency After Twenty Years: Law, Politics, and
Economics, at Duke University School of Law (Nov. 15, 1990); see also discussion
infra Part V.B.
2004] COMMENTS 447
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
human tissue bank, mistakenly distributed five organs and fifty-four
tissue products taken from a HIV-positive donor.2 8 Three organ
recipients died, and at least another three of the patients contracted
HIV from tissue transplants.29
Public concern over the transmission of HIV and other
communicable diseases forced the federal government to address the
growing concerns. "The Assistant Secretary for Health 'convened a
Public Health Service Work Group to evaluate the need for, and type
of, federal oversight that should be developed for human tissue. '30
The Work Group recommended that an investigation into the needed
level of mandatory oversight for tissue transplantation should take
place.3" The Work Group suggested that the FDA should assert
jurisdiction.32
A. Early Human Tissue Legislation
Growing public concern over the transmission of communicable
diseases through tissue transplants did not escape attention from
Congress. Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) introduced the Human Tissue
Transplantation Act of 1992 amid the growing concerns of human
tissue contamination.33 The bill established a National Council on
Tissue Transplantation which would develop a record keeping system
to facilitate the tracking of potentially contaminated tissue and
publish voluntary standards governing the procurement, processing,
and distribution of human tissue. The bill also required all tissue
banks to register with the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). Tissue banks would have to obtain a license and pay license
fees to fund the regulatory program. Furthermore, the Secretary of
HHS was directed to issue mandatory professional standards if the
voluntary standards published by the Council were not adequately
protecting the public health.
The bill received a cold reception by the human tissue industry.
The American Association of Tissue Banks (AATB) and the
American Red Cross agreed that tissue transplantation must be
federally regulated.34 The registration of human tissue banks,
28. Marc 0. Williams, The Regulation of Human Tissue in the United States:
A Regulatory and Legislative Analysis, 52 Food & Drug L. J. 409, 413 (1997).
29. Id.
30. Zodrow, supra note 24, at 413 (quoting 62 Fed. Reg. 40,429,40,430 (July
29, 1997)).
31. Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 62 Fed. Reg. 40,429, 40,430
(July 29, 1997) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 1270).
32. Id.
33. S. 2908, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(a)-(b) (1992).
34. See Williams, supra note 28, at 421-24.
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establishment of donor screening and testing procedures, and the
establishment of a tracking system were widely supported. However,
the AATB and the Red Cross opposed the bill. They argued that
mandatory standards-rather than the proposed voluntary
professional standards-were needed. "
The Human Tissue Transplantation Act of 1992 did not become
law. However, Senator Simon made a second attempt the following
year. Abandoning the National Council on Tissue Transplantation,
the Human Tissue for Transplantation Act of 1993 centralized
rulemaking authority in the Secretary of DHHS.36 The 1993 Act
required the Secretary to enact regulations concerning donor
screening, donor testing, record keeping, and good tissue practices.
Tissue banks would be required to register with the Secretary.
Unlike the 1992 Act, the 1993 Act was popular. The American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons stated, "[This] legislation takes
necessary steps to ensure the safe screening of human tissue without
impeding with undue regulation the scientific developments in the
field of biological implants and without compromising the
availability of human tissue. 37  Despite widespread support
throughout the industry, the 1993 Act never received a floor vote and
consequently died.
B. FDA's 1993 Interim Rule
Following the recommendation of the Public Health Service
Work Group, the FDA exercised jurisdiction over the human tissue
industry with the publication of an interim rule on December 14,
1993. The Interim Rule for Human Tissue Intended for
Transplantation addressed an immediate need to protect the public
health from the transmission of HIV infection and hepatitis infection
through tissue transplants.38 The interim rule required a minimal
level of infectious disease testing, donor screening, and record
keeping to help prevent the transmission of AIDS and hepatitis
through human tissue intended for transplantation.39 Although the
rule established a rudimentary regulatory program that was far less
comprehensive than the Congressional proposals, it was nevertheless
35. Id.
36. S. 1702, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(a)-(b) (1993).
37. See Williams, supra note 28, at 425 (citing Regulation of Human Tissue
Banks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Bus. Opportunities, and Tech.
of the House Comm. on Small Bus., 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1993) (statement of
Bernard A. Rineberg, President, American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons)).
38. See Human Tissue Intended For Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,514
(Dec. 14, 1993).
39. Id.
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viewed as a positive step by most of the tissue industry. 40 The FDA
found its legal authority for the interim rule in Section 361 of the
Public Health Safety Act (PHS Act). The PHS Act authorizes the
Department of Health and Human Services "to make and enforce
such regulations as judged necessary to prevent the introduction,
transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign
countries into the States or from State to State., 41 The Act also
provides statutory authority to conduct inspections, as well as the
authority to destroy any tissues found to be infected or
contaminated.42
C. 1997 Final Rule
In response to comments received after conducting three
separate workshops designed to promote and encourage
communication between the FDA and the human tissue industry, the
FDA clarified and modified the provisions of the interim rule in its
final rule, which went into effect on January 26, 1998.43 The final
rule requires facilities engaged in the recovery, screening, testing,
processing, storing, or distributing of human tissues to perform a
minimum level of medical screening and infectious disease
testing. 44 Facilities also must keep records documenting such
screening and testing and make the records available for FDA
inspection. 45 If these records are not properly kept, the final rule
allows the FDA to retain, recall, or destroy the tissue.46
More significant was what the final rule did not include. The
final rule did not require mandatory registration. Adverse
reactions-a noxious and unintended response to any human
cellular or tissue-based product for which there is a reasonable
possibility that the response may have been caused by the
product-were not required to be reported to the FDA. The final
rule also did not proffer regulations governing the individual steps
of the manufacturing process. Industry leaders considered these
provisions essential to any comprehensive regulatory scheme.
40. See Zodrow, supra note 24, at 415.
41. See Human Tissue Intended For Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,514,
65,516 (Dec. 14, 1993).
42. Id.
43. See Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 62 Fed. Reg. 40,429 (July
29, 1997).
44. Id. at 40,429.
45. Id.
46. Id.
450 [Vol. 65
COMMENTS
D. FDA's Proposed Rules
Although the final rule fell short of establishing a comprehensive
regulatory system, the FDA eased criticism with the publication of
The Proposed Approach to Regulation of Cellular and Tissue-Based
Products.47 This document set forth a road map for future regulations.
The FDA acknowledged that human tissue regulation under the 1993
interim and 1997 final rules was extremely fragmented.48 In light of
the development of new products, combined with a growing
awareness of infectious disease concerns, the current piecemeal
approach to tissue regulation was no longer adequate.
The proposed regulations were published in three parts: 1)
establishment of registration and listing, 2) suitability determination
of donors, and 3) current good tissue practices. They are designed to
instill public confidence in the safety of human tissue transplants
while also ensuring that the availability of new products will not be
encumbered by over-regulation. 9 Tissues will be regulated based on
the potential health risk posed by the particular tissue.5°
1. Establishment Registration and Listing
The lack of a registration system had prevented the FDA from
acquiring information regarding the full size of the cell and tissue
industry and the scope of its products.5 Therefore, on May 14, 1998,
the FDA published a proposal: Establishment Registration and
Listing for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based
Products. This set of regulations would require facilities engaged in
the recovery, screening, testing, processing, storing, or distributing of
human tissues to register with the FDA and list their products.52
The FDA initially planned to enact all three of the proposed
regulations together, thus creating a comprehensive regulatory
program in part 127 l." Nevertheless, on January 19, 2001, the FDA
finalized the proposed rule.54 The FDA stated, "We are taking this
47. See FDA, Proposed Approach, supra note 6.
48. Id.
49. ld. at 7.
50. Id. at 6.
51. Establishment Registration and Listing for Manufacturers of Human
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,744, 26,746 (May 14, 1998)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 207, 807, 1271).
52. Id. at 26753.
53. Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products;
Establishment Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5448 (Jan 19, 2001)
(codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 207, 807, 1271).
54. Id. Substantially the rule did not change. However, President Clinton's
"plain language initiative," which required federal agencies to publish government
4512004]
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action because of recent concerns raised about the safety of tissue,
which have led us to believe that accelerating the collection of basic
information about the rapidly growing tissue industry is vital."55
However, despite pressure from Congress and the public to enact any
finalized regulations as soon as possible, the FDA decided to delay
the effective date of the final rule to January 21, 2004.56 The FDA
cited its desire to enact all of the proposed regulations within a
relatively short time period, credting a comprehensive regulatory
program in part 1271.
2. Suitability Determination of Donors
The FDA envisioned replacing the donor screening and testing
requirements established by the 1993 Interim Rule in the near future
with more extensive requirements.57 Six years later, the FDA
published its second proposal: Suitability Determination for Donors
of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products.58 On May 25, 2004,
the "Suitability Determination for Donors" regulations were finalized,
although this rule will not be effective until May 25, 2005.59
Once in effect, the donor suitability regulations will expand
government oversight in two ways. First, the regulations will
increase the number of products covered by the screening and testing
requirements. 6 Second, the regulations will expand the mandatory
documents that are easier to understand, has resulted in substantial editorial changes
from the proposed rule. Id. at 5447-49.
55. Id. at 5448.
56. Originally all facilities to be regulated under Section 361 of the Public
Health Service Act were required to register with the FDA by January 21, 2003.
This deadline has been pushed back to January 21, 2004. See Human Cells,
Tissues, and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration and
Listing, 68 Fed. Reg. 2689 (Jan. 21, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271).
57. See Human Tissue Intended For Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,514,
65,516 (Dec. 14, 1993).
58. See Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,696 (Sept. 30, 1999) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 210, 211, 820, 1271).
59. See Eligibility Determination of Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and
Cellular and Tissue-based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29,786 (May 25, 2004) (codified
at 21 C.F.R. pts. 210, 211, 820, 1271). The title of the proposed rule was changed
from "Suitability Determination for Donors of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based
Products" to "Eligibility Determination of Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and
Cellular and Tissue-based Products"in the final rule.
60. For instance, the FDA is proposing to require donors of reproductive cells
and tissue to be tested. Neisseria gonorrhea and Chlamydia trachomatis have both
been transmitted through artificial insemination procedures. Id. at 52,698.
[Vol. 65
testing and screening requirements to include additional diseases.61
In certain situations, however, human tissues that would normally be
subjected to FDA regulation are exempted. Human tissues intended
for autologous use would not require testing.62 Likewise, the FDA
would not compel reproductive cells to be tested if the recipient is a
sexually intimate partner of the donor.63 Nevertheless, while the FDA
does not obligate facilities to test these human tissues, such testing is
recommended as a general safety measure.'
3. Good Tissue Practices
Although the donor-suitability rule will require facilities to screen
and test donor tissues for certain communicable diseases, additional
measures must be taken to further reduce the public health risk
associated with tissue transplantation. Errors in product labeling and
record keeping, substandard cleaning of facilities and equipment, and
improper processing procedures could contaminate human tissues
during the manufacturing process. Thus, on January 8, 2001, the
FDA proposed its third rule: Current Good Tissue Practice for
Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-Based Products;
Inspection and Enforcement.65 As of this writing, the "Current Good
Tissue Practices" regulations have not been finalized.
The term "good tissue practices" envelopes a multitude of steps
within the manufacturing process. Generally, "current good tissue
practices" requires facilities engaged in the recovery, screening, testing,
processing, storing, or distributing of human tissues to comply with
minimum industry standards and procedures in order to prevent tissue
contamination and to preserve tissue function and integrity.' Under the
proposed rule, facilities must: 1) maintain current processing
methods;67 2) establish a quality program;6" 3) maintain a sanitary work
61. The current regulations only require testing for Human Immunodeficiency
Virus Type 1, Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 2, Hepatitis B, and Hepatitis
C. The new regulations will require tissues to be tested and screened for: syphilis,
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, human T-cell lymphotrophic virus type I and II,
Cytomegalovirus, Neisseria gonorrhea, and Chlamydia trachomatis. Id. at
52,697-98.
62. Autologous use means the implantation, transplantation, infusion, or
transfer of a human cellular or tissue-based product back into the individual from
whom the cells or tissue comprising such product were removed. Id. at 52,609.
63. Id. at 52,707.
64. Id. at 52,706-07.
65. See Current Good Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and
Tissue-Based Products; Inspection and Enforcement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1508 (Jan. 8,
2001) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271).
66. Id.
67. Since advancements in technology are inevitable, the FDA is not proposing
COMMENTS 4532004]
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environment; 69 4) perform routine maintenance on equipment;7 ° 5)
develop a record-keeping system;7" 6) establish a product tracking
system;" 7) meet certain labeling requirements; 73 8) report adverse
reactions and product deviations; and 9) document and review all
complaints. 7
111. APPREHENSION ON CAPITOL HILL: CONGRESS THREATENS THE
USE OF FORCE
A. May 2001 Senate Hearings
On May 24, 2001, the Senate Governmental Affairs Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations convened to examine the current
state of the human tissue industry. Deputy Inspector General George
Grob for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
specific processing methods. Rather, the FDA would insist that facilities maintain
up-to-date processing methods that evolve with changing industry standards. Id. at
1516.
68. A quality program would function to ensure the effectiveness of the
implemented processes and procedures. Id. at 1512-14.
69. An unsanitary facility has the potential of exposing otherwise healthy
human tissue to additional contamination risks. Id. at 1514-15.
70. In addition to performing adequate cleaning and disinfecting procedures,
facilities would also be obliged to perform scheduled calibrations of equipment
according to established procedures. Id. at 1515.
71. In order for the FDA to make certain facilities are complying with FDA
regulations, facilities must also maintain records detailing the procedures used in
their manufacturing processes. Id. at 1518.
72. The need for a product tracking system became apparent in the wake of the
Lifenet debacle. After discovering that the donor tissue was infected with HIV,
investigators attempted to contact all recipients of the donor tissue. The
investigators, however, could not account for all of the contaminated tissue; some
of the hospitals did not have records of even receiving the tissue. Several of the
recipients of the contaminated tissue were not warned or advised to seek medical
treatment due to the lack of a tracking system. Id. at 1518-19.
73. Labeling procedures would prevent product mix-ups. The label must
contain the name of the distributing facility, a description of the product, and an
expiration date. Also, storage temperature, warnings, and instructions for use must
be included on the label or within the packaging. Id. at 1517, 1521.
74. Facilities must report adverse reactions to the FDA if the reaction: is fatal;
is life-threatening; causes permanent damage to body function or structure; or
requires medical or surgical intervention. Product deviations--events that represent
a deviation from current good tissue practice, applicable standards, or established
specifications-must be reported to the FDA if they could reasonably lead to a
reportable adverse reaction. Id. at 1520-21.
75. A complaint is any communication that alleges: a product has transmitted
a communicable disease; a product's function or integrity is impaired; or any other
problem that may have resulted from non-compliance with good tissue practices.
Id.
testified that growth of the industry has outpaced the development of
regulations, making current federal oversight insufficient. 6  Dr.
Valerie Rao, a medical examiner from the state of Florida,
substantiated Mr. Grob's testimony. Dr. Rao's investigation painted
a grave picture of the state of the human tissue industry. One
company failed to perform routine blood or bone marrow aspiration
cultures used to detect possible diseases. The company also did not
require an autopsy and, consequently, did not know the donor's cause
of death. They would accept donors with non-metastasizing
malignant tumors of the breast, colon, cervix, and lung.77
Following the testimony before the committee, Chairwoman
Susan Collins (R-ME) called for the FDA to increase its inspection
of human tissue banks and impose sanctions where appropriate.78
B. May 2003 Senate Hearings
On May 14, 2003, the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
held a hearing to address public concerns over the safety of human
tissue transplants. Dr. Jeanne Linden, Director of Blood and Tissue
Resources for New York State Department of Health, testified before
the senate panel describing New York's regulatory system governing
human tissue banks.79 In 1991, the state of New York established
mandatory standards overseeing testing and screening of human
tissue. The state mandates that tissue facilities develop a
recordkeeping system in order to facilitate product tracking. Adverse
reactions must be reported, and tissue banks must seek a license from
the New York State Department of Health. Upon implementation of
the comprehensive regulatory scheme, New York uncovered many
dangerous practices within the human tissue industry. Dr. Linden
presented some of the more egregious cases:
[T]wo semen bank operators were using only themselves as
donors, but, through the use of fictitious names, led
physicians and recipients to believe that more than a dozen
donors were available through the program. Testing and
record keeping at this bank were virtually nonexistent.
Another reported incident concerned a hematopoietic stem
cell bank that transplanted the wrong component-the ABO-
incompatible red cells that had been removed from the bone
76. Zodrow, supra note 24, at430-31.
77. Tissue Banks: Is ... Oversight Adequate?, supra note 13 (testimony of
Valerie J. Rao).
78. Zodrow, supra note 24, at 430.
79. See Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues, supra note 7, at 17-24
(testimony of Jeanne V. Linden).
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marrow, rather than the marrow itself. Had the marrow not
been retrievable, the patient ... could have died as a result of
a severely impaired immune system.8 °
Dr. Linden declared that these cases demonstrate the importance of
implementing a comprehensive regulatory system that ensures proper
labeling, record-keeping, and tissue tracking procedures are
followed.81
Dr. Jesse Goodman, the Director for Biologics Evaluation and
Research, also testified before the Committee setting forth the current
state of FDA regulation.8" Dr. Goodman stated that, while the goal
of the FDA is to prevent the spread of communicable diseases and
enhance public confidence in human tissue products, the FDA
"[seeks] to accomplish these goals in a manner that will not
discourage the development of new products. ' ' 83 Both Republicans
and Democrats chastised the FDA for its failure to expediously enact
a comprehensive regulatory framework. Despite governmental
hearings in 2001 exposing the dangerous practices within the tissue
industry, two years and several tragedies later "[tihe FDA still has not
kept its commitment to addressing and minimizing this public health
risk through effective regulation."' The FDA, refusing to give a
timeline for implementation of its proposed rules, responded, "[these]
are complex rules and we want to do them right." Senator Mark
Pryor-acknowledging that he was completely unaware of the
dangers associated with human tissue transplants when he received
an Achilles tendon transplant-told Dr. Goodman, "I [am] not
satisfied with your answers. 86
C. Brian Lykins Human Tissue Transplant Safety Act of 2003
Senator Collins introduced the Brian Lykins Human Tissue
Transplant Safety Act of 2003 immediately following the May 14,
2003 hearing.87 "It is obvious to me that without a statutory deadline
80. Id. at 56.
81. Id. at 58.
82. Id. at 26-38 (testimony of Jesse L. Goodman).
83. Id. at 64.
84. This was the statement of Senator Collins at the May 2003 Hearings.
Senate Panel Criticizes FDA on Tissue Bank Regulations, CongressDaily/A.M.,
May 15, 2003.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. S. 1063, 108th Cong., 1 st Sess. (2003). Senator Collins introduced the bill
for herself, Senator Richard Durbin (D-Ill), Mr. Coleman, and Senator Mark Pryor
(D-Ark). Id.
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[the] FDA will continue to delay and delay," stated Senator Collins.8
The bill would require any entity engaged in the recovery, screening,
testing, processing, labeling, packaging, or distribution of human
cellular or tissue-based products to register with the Commissioner of
Food and Drugs.8 9 The bill mandates the Commissioner of Food and
Drugs to issue regulations within ninety days of enactment specifying
procedures for donor eligibility screening and testing, good tissue
practices, and inspection and enforcement. Furthermore, the
commissioner may conduct inspections of any human tissue facility
in order to ensure compliance with the statute or regulations
promulgated under the statute. If products are deemed noncompliant,
the commissioner may order the recall or destruction of tissue.90
In effect this bill would require the FDA to enact its proposed
regulations. Nevertheless, the proposed legislation has not become
law at the time of this writing.
IV. A CALL FOR QUICK, EFFECTIVE RULEMAKING
A. A Matter of Life and Death
The consequences of receiving a contaminated human tissue
transplant are grave. Numerous deaths have occurred resulting from
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease-infected human tissue transplants. 91 A
1997 report linked forty-two deaths to CJD-infected dura mater grafts
in Japan.92 Over 114 deaths have been reported worldwide.93 Human
tissues contaminated with bacteria and fungi also pose serious health
risks. Jay James, a San Francisco stockbroker, received a bacterially-
infected human tissue implant in his knee.94 James underwent five
more operations to cure the clostridium infection in his knee. Alan
Minvielle suffered a similar fate.95 Minvielle, a man who once
88. Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues, supra note 7, at 4
(statement of Senator Susan M. Collins).
89. S. 1063, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003).
90. Id.
91. Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) is a disorder that causes a rapid decrease
of mental function and movement. Complete dementia occurs within six months of
the onset of symptoms. Death follows shortly, usually within seven months of the
first symptoms.
92. Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Associated with Cadaveric Dura Mater Grafts-
Japan, January 1979-May 1996, 46 MMWR 1066 (1997), available at
http://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/PrevGuid/mOO49829/mOO49829.asp.
93. Joanne Laurier, Human Organs: The Next Futures Market, at
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/apr2002/body-a26.shtml (last visited Jan. 3,
2004).
94. See What Killed Brian Lykins?, supra note 2.
95. Id.
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competed in marathons, now can barely walk. Yet, the consequence
of receiving a fungal or bacterially-infected tissue can be much worse.
A five-year-old girl from New Mexico died of a rare fungus infection
after receiving a human tissue transplant.96 Brian Lykins died
suddenly from a clostridia infection.97
While the highly publicized death of Brian Lykins increased
awareness both on Capitol Hill and within the human tissue industry,
the government has had difficulty quantifyin& the potential risk of
infection resulting from contaminated tissues. An investigation by
the CDC following Lykins' death uncovered fifty-four more cases of
infection resulting from contaminated tissues.99 Yet when asked how
serious is the problem of tissue contamination, Dr. Daniel Jernigan,
the lead CDC investigator, stated, "We don't really know.'°° Under
current regulations, tissue banks are not required to report adverse
reactions or product deviations to the FDA.10 Cases of tissue
contamination generally can slip under the radar unless a facility
voluntarily reports an adverse reaction or a civil lawsuit is brought by
or on behalf of the recipient.
The overall risk posed by transplanted human tissues is thought
to be quite low despite the difficulty quantifying the risk of disease
transmission."°2 Nevertheless, human tissues still pose a major health
risk. A single contaminated donor can lead to a public health
epidemic. Nine patients across eight states received tissue implants
from the same cadaveric donor of the clostridia-infected tissue
received by Brian Lykins. 103 In the mid-1980s tissue from a single
HIV-infected donor was implanted in fifty-six separate recipients."°4
96. FDA Orders Recall of Cadaver Tissue Processed by Cryolife, 9 No. 11
Andrews Med. Devices Litig. Rep. 3 (Aug. 23, 2002).
97. See What Killed Brian Lykins?, supra note 2.
98. Following the death of Brian Lykins, the attendance at a conference held
by the Third World Congress of Tissue Banking and the AATB was three times
larger than expected. See Jill Burcum, State Case May Bring Tissue-Bank
Changes; Industry Delegates Bridle at Publicity, but Say the Result is Likely to be
Safer Implant Material, Star. Trib. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug. 26, 2002, at IA.
99. Id.
100. See What Killed Brian Lykins?, supra note 2.
101. C.f Current Good Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human Cellular
and Tissue-Based Products; Inspection and Enforcement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1508 (Jan.
8, 2001). See also What Killed Brian Lykins?, supra note 2 (Dr. Daniel Jernigan
stated, "This particular problem, especially with these rare kinds of bacteria, [is] not
reportable. So in the past, we [have] not heard about them.").
102. See Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues, supra note 7 (statement
of Jesse L. Goodman).
103. Id. (statement of Jeanne V. Linden). One of the recipients of the tissue
developed an infection. However, cultures tested negative for Clostridium
Sordellii, and he eventually recovered after undergoing an antibiotic treatment. Id.
104. See Williams, supra note 28, at 413.
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Due to poor record-keeping and the absence of a product tracking
system, the tissue bank could locate and notify only thirty-four of the
recipients. 105 Some potentially infected recipients could have
unknowingly transmitted the disease to others.
B. Impetus to Federal Regulation
The serious and sometimes deadly nature of these viral, bacterial,
and fungal diseases requires measures aimed at the prevention of the
introduction and transmission of the pathogens. Likely due to the
absence of government oversight, the industry has attempted to self-
regulate. °6 Private organizations such as the American Association of
Tissue Banks and the Eye Bank Association of America offer stringent
accreditation programs that provide uniform industry standards aimed
at preventing the introduction and spread of pathogens. 0 7 Many
facilities have willingly adopted these standards. But since
membership in these private organizations is voluntary and because
there are additional costs with maintaining higher quality standards,
some facilities choose not to participate in these accreditation
programs. Even when a facility does participate in the accreditation
program, the private associations have no enforcement power other
than dismissal from the organization.
The filing of civil lawsuits has likely encouraged voluntary
adherence to proper testing and tissue processing procedures also.
However, the tort system alone is not sufficient to prevent the spread
of communicable diseases. Whereas agency rules are prospective and
generally create clear requirements that make it easy for regulated
entities to know and understand their obligations, case-by-case
adjudications are retroactive in nature.1"8 A plaintiff may only bring a
lawsuit after a harm. This may prove to be too little too late if the
transmitted disease is terminal or in the case of a catastrophic
epidemic."°  Furthermore, the additional costs associated with
105. Id. The tissue bank, LifeNet Transplantation Services, became aware of the
problem on April 26, 1991, when the Colorado Department of Health reported that an
elderly Denver woman who had received a hipjoint from the donor had tested positive
for the virus. In prior reports, a Medical College of Virginia patient who received the
infected donor's heart died in 1986, and two recipients of the donor's kidneys died in
1988 and 1990. None of these cases were brought to the attention of the transplant
network until early May 1991. Id.
106. See Human Tissue Intended For Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,514
(Dec. 14, 1993).
107. See American Association of Tissue Banks, at http://www.aatb.org; Eye
Bank Association of America, at http://www.restoresight.org.
108. See generally Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro. Administrative
Procedure and the Decline of the Trial, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 473, 481 (May 2003).
(discussing the benefits of regulations).
109. See supra Section IV.A.
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maintaining higher quality standards may entice some tissue facilities
to ignore the risk of a lawsuit in order to increase their short-term
profitability. 1 0
The failure of even a relatively small percentage of tissue banks to
adhere to uniform industry standards could have a profound effect on
the industry. Tissue banks worry that the publicity resulting from cases
of disease transmission could lead to a decrease in organ donations."'
Even worse, public confidence in these products could diminish. Self-
regulation and tort-based regulation have proven to be insufficient in
protecting the public health." 2 Consequently, members within the
human tissue industry have welcomed federal oversight. The president
of the AATB encouraged "immediate compulsory registration of all
tissue banks to determine the scope of tissue banking" and the
"[establishment of] uniform donor selection requirements to ensure the
lowest possible risk of disease transmission to patients... 3  The
national head of the American Red Cross Tissue Services stated, "The
American Red Cross feels strongly that appropriate, enforceable federal
standards are needed to ensure the continued safety of the people who
depend upon human tissue to sustain or improve the quality of their
lives and to foster continued public support for the collection and use
of transplantable tissue.'11 4
V. PROMULGATING HUMAN TISSUE REGULATIONS UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
The FDA took an initial step in preventing the introduction and
transmission of pathogens with the promulgation of its 1993 Interim
rule. Yet, seven years since introducing its comprehensive regulatory
110. For instance, Cryolife maintained two inventories of tissue for release: one
for patients in the state of New York and the second for patients in other states. See
Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues, supra note 7, at 19 (statement of
Jeanne V. Linden).
111. See Jill Burcum, supra note 98. Doug Prete, senior vice president for
quality and compliance for Lifenet tissue bank in Virginia Beach, Virginia, stated
that the industry's biggest concern following the highly publicized death of Brian
Lykins is how the publicity affects donor families. Id.
112. History has shown that the tort system and self-regulation efforts alone are not
sufficient to protect the public health from potentially deadly diseases transmitted
through human tissues. See generally What Killed Brian Lykins?, supra note 2 (Jay
James brought a lawsuit against Cryolife, the supplier of the clostridium-infected
tissue, in 1998. Cryolife settled out of court. Three years later, Brian Lykins died
after receiving a similar tissue from Cryolife with the same clostridium infection.); see
also Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues, supra note 7 (testimony of Dr.
Jeanne Linden concerning egregious practices within the human tissue industry).
113. See Human Tissue Intended For Transplantation, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,514,
65,515 (Dec. 14, 1993).
114. Id.
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plan and eleven years since acknowledging the need for more
extensive regulations governing the human tissue industry, the FDA
has not finalized all of the proposed human tissue regulations
despite support from both the industry and Congress. Human tissue
banks today are still operating with little government oversight." 5
What is taking the FDA so long?
The FDA's mission to protect the public health has become
increasingly more complex with the onslaught of new, rapidly
expanding technologies." 6  Advances in gene therapy,' 7
bioinformatics," 8 and other biotechnologies are pushing the
envelope of modern science. The FDA is struggling to keep up with
these technological advances." 9 Once the FDA does attempt to
address new problems facing the public health through the
promulgation of regulations, the FDA is confronted with a plethora
of procedural requirements that severely slow the rulemaking
process. 20 These additional requirements mandate the FDA to
balance the protection of public health with the potential social,
115. The "Current Good Tissue Practices" regulations have not been finalized;
the "Eligibility Determination of Donors" final rule will not go into effect until May
25, 2005; and the "Establishment Registration and Listing" regulations, although
finalized on January 19, 2001, have only been in full effect since January 21, 2004.
See Current Good Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and Tissue-
Based Products; Inspection and Enforcement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1508 (Jan. 8, 2001);
Eligibility Determination of Donors of Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular and
Tissue-based Products, 69 Fed. Reg. 29786 (May 25,2004); Human Cells, Tissues,
and Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration and Listing,
68 Fed. Reg. 2689 (Jan. 21, 2003).
116. See Food and Drug Admin., FDA's Mission Statement, at
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.htnl (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
117. Gene therapy is a technique for correcting defective genes responsible for
disease development. Most studies replace an abnormal gene with a normal gene.
The death of eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger in 1999 after participating in a gene
therapy trial was a major setback. Gelsinger's death forced the FDA to reevaluate
its oversight process. See Human Genome Project Information, Gene Therapy, at
http://www.oml.gov/sci/techresources/Human-Genomelmedicine/genetherapy.shtml
(last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
118. Bioinformatics involves the use of mathematical, statistical, and computing
methods that aim to solve biological problems using DNA and amino acid
sequences and related information. See Bioinformatics Frequently Asked
Questions, at http://bioinformatics.org/faq/#definitions (last visited Jan. 10, 2005).
119. See Alison R. McCabe, A Precarious Balancing Act-The Role of the FDA
as Protector of Public Health and Industry Wealth, 36 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 787,792-
98. (2003) (stating that the FDA is ill-equipped to monitor these promising areas of
medicine); Judith A. Cregan, Light, Fast, and Flexible: A New Approach to
Regulation of Human Gene Therapy, 32 McGeorge L. Rev. 261, 281-82 (2000)
(addressing concern that the FDA lacks the expertise and resources to regulate the
biotechnology industry).
120. See Current Good Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human Cellular and
Tissue-Based Products; Inspection and Enforcement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1508.
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environmental, and economic impact of its rules. During the 1960s
and early 1970s, administrative rules could be promulgated in six
months.' 2' Today, major rules proposed by administrative agencies
take a minimum of five years from proposal to enactment. The
FDA's comprehensive regulatory program governing human
tissues-first introduced in 1997-is following this trend.
Professor E. Donald Elliot characterizes this tendency as the
"ossification" of the rulemaking process.'23
A. The Birth of the Administrative State
Early federal regulation was promulgated through legislation
followed by judicial enforcement. Following the Great Depression,
President Roosevelt sought to expand the federal bureaucracy,
believing traditional procedures were too lethargic. Congress
lacked the capacity and expertise to handle growing public welfare
concerns. While courts also functioned to regulate social behavior
through common law causes of action, such adjudications react to
societal ills. Rules, on the other hand, allow the government to look
prospectively, preventing societal ills before they come to pass.
Roosevelt envisioned "administratively organized communities of
highly trained professionals" to relieve the legislative and judicial
branches. 24 The administrative agencies would have expertise in
their respective field, allowing it to efficiently promulgate and
enforce regulations intended to improve society's general welfare.
Roosevelt's vision did not have universal appeal.' 25 The
administrative agencies lacked political accountability; unelected
bureaucrats directed the agencies. Critics argued that rulemaking
through administrative agencies violated due process. 126 However,
criticism was quieted in 1947 with the enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 127 The APA sought the
middle ground by mandating specific administrative procedures,
balancing the efficiency of administrative rulemaking with
procedural checks.
121. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the
Rulemaking Process, 41 Duke L.J. 1385 (1992).
122. See Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century,
78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 447 (2003).
123. See Elliot, supra note 27.
124. See Levy & Shapiro, supra note 108, at 477 (citing Sidney A. Shapiro, A
Delegation Theory of the APA, 10 Admin. L.J. 89, 97 (1996) (quoting Joel D.
Schwartz, Book Review, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 820 (1984))).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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The 1970s witnessed a boom in agency rulemaking.12 8 Agencies
began to use informal rulemaking-a form of rulemaking that allows
an agency to enact rules without the need for formal hearings or
adjudication. Unlike formal rulemaking, the informal rulemaking
process does not require trial-type proceedings. Rather, the agency
conducts a "paper hearing." The agency must put the public on notice
of potential rulemaking, accept written comments from the interested
public, and explain the final rule in a concise general statement of
their basis and purpose. 129 Informal rulemaking is designed to allow
an agency to intelligently and efficiently create rules while improving
the legitimacy of agency rulemaking by allowing the President,
Congress, and the general public to actively participate in the
rulemaking process."' Legal scholars and federal agencies agreed:
Informal rulemaking was an "ideal vehicle" for developing new
comprehensive regulations. 31
B. Ossification of the Rulemaking Process
The informal rulemaking process was originally a model of
governmental efficiency; Professor Kenneth Culp Davis even called
informal rulemaking "one of the greatest inventions of modern
government."1 32 However, such optimism has soured. Efforts by all
three political branches to exert control over administrative agencies
has stricken the informal rulemaking process with additional
procedural, analytical, and substantive requirements. Agencies now
must run the gauntlet in order to promulgate rules.
Additional analytical requirements imposed by Congress and the
President have resulted in paralysis by analysis. 133 Agencies now
must provide "impact statements" before promulgating rules. For
instance, Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to assess all costs
and benefits of available regulatory alternatives. 34 Congress, through
128. Justice Scalia referred to the 1970s as the "era of rulemaking." See
McGarity, supra note 120 (citing Antonin Scalia, Back to Basics: Making Law
without Making Rules, Regulation, July/August 1981, at 25).
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
130. Id.
131. See McGarity, supra note 121, at 1385.
132. Id. (citing Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 6.15, at 283
(1st ed. Supp. 1970)).
133. Stewart, supra note 122, at 477.
134. When regulation is deemed necessary, the agency is to adopt regulatory
approaches that maximize net benefits. Agencies should consider potential
economic, environmental, public health, and public safety benefits. Once the rule
is finalized, it must be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for
approval before its issuance, further delaying the effective date of any proposed
regulations. See Current Good Tissue Practice for Manufacturers of Human
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legislation such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act and the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, has inflicted even more analytical
requirements. The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires agencies to
analyze a rule's potential impact on small entities and analyze
regulatory options that would minimize the impact. 35 The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act requires agencies to perform a cost/benefit
analysis if a regulatory proposal will cost either the private sector,
state, or local governments $100 million any given year. 36
Most of the blame for ossification of the rulemaking process has
fallen at the feet of the judiciary. A reviewing court examines an
agency's decisionmaking process to ensure the agency has carefully
and thoughtfully considered all relevant issues before it. If "the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise," the reviewing court may set the agency action aside by
declaring the rule arbitrary and capricious."'
Although the Supreme Court has asserted that the standard of
review is narrow, in application, judicial scrutiny has been quite
substantial. 3 While the court does not make the ultimate decision,
it insists that the agency take a "hard look" at all relevant factors.'39
The effects of this "hard look" are profound. Agencies must develop
and maintain a rulemaking record in order to survive judicial
scrutiny." They must respond to all significant comments and
provide extensive reasons for its decisionmaking. Consequently,
interested parties, especially those with abundant resources, can
inundate an agency with numerous written comments, attacking every
facet of an agency's proposed rule.' 4 ' Agencies are left to guess
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Inspection and Enforcement, 66 Fed. Reg.
1508 (Jan. 8, 2001).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43, 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2867 (1983).
138. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000). The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Id.
139. See Harold Levanthal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 514 (1974).
140. See McGarity, supra note 121.
141. For instance, in 1996, the FDA received 700,000 pieces of commentary
concerning proposed tobacco regulations. A single comment submitted by the
tobacco industry consisted of 2,000 pages with an astounding 45,000 pages of
supporting documents. The FDA was forced to provide 200,000 pages of factual
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which issues the reviewing court will consider relevant and the
corresponding depth of analysis required. As a result, agencies now
are spending an inordinate amount of time preparing supporting
documents, responding to public comments, and preparing the record
for all possible attacks upon judicial review.1 42 Consequently, the
promulgation of a major rule now takes approximately five years to
complete. 143 Agencies have determined that "any faster action would
simply invite reversal on judicial review."' 44
C. Alternatives to Informal Rulemaking
1. The Good Cause Exception
Under certain circumstances agencies may abandon informal
rulemaking altogether. Notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
are not required "when the agency for good cause finds (and
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in
the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are
impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."'
45
Numerous reports citing the transmission of communicable diseases
through human tissue transplants seem to establish a serious and
immediate threat to the public health that would exempt human tissue
regulations from notice-and-comment procedures. However, courts
have held that the good cause exception to the APA's notice-and-
comment requirement is to be "narrowly construed and only
reluctantly countenanced."'
46
Such stringent judicial review has likely neutralized the
applicability of the good cause exception to human tissue regulations.
In a 1995 hearing concerning the detention of certain human tissue
materials to support its basis and purpose of its rule.
142. See McGarity, supra note 121.
143. See Stewart, supra note 122.
144. Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The
Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 Yale J. on Reg. 257, 284 (1987).
145. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (2000). In National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v.
Kennedy, 572 F.2d 377 (1978), the court interpreted the terms "impracticable,"
"unecessary," and "contrary to public interest." "Impracticable" means a situation
in which the due and required execution of an agency's functions would be
unavoidably prevented if it had to comply with the notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures. "Unnecessary" means unnecessary so far as the public is concerned.
Rules that are minor and attract little public interest would qualify as "unnecessary."
"Contrary to public interest" supplements .the terms "impracticable" or
"unnecessary". If the informal rulemaking procedures would severely inhibit the
agency from carrying out its functions or there is little or no public interest, the
"contrary to public interest" exception may apply. Id.
146. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045
(D.C.Cir. 1980).
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products by the FDA, Judge Motz expressed doubt that the FDA
had any basis for issuing the 1993 interim rule without first
accepting public comment. Judge Motz stated, "There certainly is
a substantial question as to whether or not the adoption of the
"interim rule" by emergency measure was appropriate .... I have
grave doubts as to whether or not any emergency existed."'147 After
weeks of negotiations, the FDA and the tissue bank reached a
compromise, thus the validity of the interim rule was never
officially challenged in court. 14
8
2. Nonlegislative Rules
Agencies have turned to less formal regulatory
processes-policy statements, guidance documents, and
interpretative rules-that do not require public participation in order
to avoid informal rulemaking. 149 Such rules can be promulgated
quickly with few resources. Agencies can hurdle the analytical and
procedural quagmires associated with informal rulemaking and
simply publish an interpretative rule or a general statement of
policy.
A serious drawback to nonlegislative rulemaking is their lack of
enforceability. Nonlegislative rules such as guidance documents
and policy statements generally are not binding on the public. 150
Interpretive rules, while binding on the public, must work within the
rubric of existing rules. 15' Nonlegislative rulemaking should
continue to be used as supplements to existing rules, but they are
not a practical option for creating new, extensive regulations.
147. Richard A. Merill, Human Tissues and Reproductive Cloning: New
Technologies Challenge FDA, 3 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 1 (2002) (citing
Transcript of Temporary Restraining Order Hearing Before the Honorable J.
Frederick Motz, United States District Court Judge at 5, 89, Biodynamics Int'l, Inc.
v. United States, No. JFM-95-919 (D. Md. 1995)).
148. Id.
149. For instance, the FDA, while unable to finalize its proposed regulations,
has published a guidance document reminding human tissue manufacturers that
product testing should include bacteria and fungi as well as other known
transmittable viruses. Guidance for Industry: Validation of Procedures for
Processing of Human Tissues Intended for Transplantation, 67 Fed. Reg. 11,343
(Mar. 13, 2002).
150. See McGarity, supra note 121.
151. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 113 S.Ct. 1913 (1993); see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L.
Rev. 59 (1995) (discussing attempts by the Court to give interpretative rules greater
deference in order to limit the scope of the duty to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking).
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D. Efficiency or Accountability?
The balance between accountability and efficiency varies greatly
between the available rulemaking procedures. The additional
procedural, analytical, and substantive requirements imposed on
informal rulemaking have imposed a significant level of
accountability on the bureaucracy. By making an agency analyze and
consider all significant issues raised by public comments, the court
ensures the administrative agency is making an informed decision and
remains politically neutral. The agency must give the same credence
to a comment submitted by a single individual as it does to a
comment submitted by a powerful special interest group. Analytical
requirements imposed by both Congress and the President work to
prevent tunnel vision by forcing agencies to consider economic,
environment, public health, and public safety effects of its proposed
rules. Such analysis can forewarn Congress and/or the President of
potential over-regulation. They may choose to influence the agency
through the notice-and-comment procedure, or they may exercise
other political powers to obstruct such rulemaking. However, this
increase in accountability has its expense. The additional procedural,
analytical, and substantive requirements have stripped informal
rulemaking of its principal attribute: efficiency.
Conversely, alternatives to informal rulemaking such as
nonlegislative rules and the good cause exception allow an agency to
quickly promulgate regulations. Yet, several commentators question
whether an abandonment of the notice and comment procedure is a
step forward or a step backward. Unelected bureaucrats can
promulgate nonlegislative rules with little or no procedural checks.
A wholesale shift to these less formal devices could result in
unaccountable government and lead to arbitrary decisionmaking. 52
In addition, the quality of rules is likely to decline. Leaders within
the affected industry are not given the opportunity to offer
recommendations and voice concerns.
VI. STREAMLINING THE FDA RULEMAKING PROCESS WITH THE
CREATION OF A REGULATORY FAST-TRACK SYSTEM
A. Striking the Balance Between Efficiency and Accountability
Human tissues serve a crucial role in medicine, and they have the
potential for providing many important new therapies. 53  Yet
contaminated tissues pose a direct and serious threat to the public
152. See McGarity, supra note 121.
153. See supra note 6.
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health. 54 The informal rulemaking process has been too lethargic to
respond to the emerging health risks posed by human tissues,
subjecting the general public to unnecessary health risks due to
regulatory lag. Likewise, an alternative such as the good cause
exemption is not a viable option. The narrow construction of the
good cause exception casts serious doubt as to whether human tissue
regulations could survive judicial scrutiny notwithstanding Judge
Motz's clearly erroneous assessment of the seriousness of human
tissue contamination. Plus, rapid advancements in biotechnology
have challenged the expertise of the FDA.'55 When promulgating
regulations governing such a complex field as human tissues, industry
involvement in the rulemaking process is vital.
Ideally, political accountability and efficiency would coexist
within the rulemaking process. However, these characteristics are
inversely proportional: an increase in efficiency usually results in a
decrease in accountability and vice versa. 56 Since human tissues call
for both quick rulemaking and a certain level of industry
involvement, the FDA needs a rulemaking procedure that strikes a
balance between accountability and efficiency. Using section 112 of
the Food and Drug Modernization Act as a model, Congress should
develop a regulatory fast-track system that allows the FDA to
circumvent many of the procedural, analytical, and substantive
hurdles that severely slow the informal rulemaking process while
maintaining an appropriate level of political accountability.
B. A Model: The Drug Fast-Track System under the Food and
Drug Modernization Act of 1997
Since the enactment of The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act of 1938, the FDA has required new drugs to obtain pre-market
approval.157 Manufacturers had to prove by substantial evidence that
its new drug met certain safety and efficacy standards prior to
154. See discussion supra Section IV.A.
155. See discussion supra notes 117-119.
156. Agency rulemaking with no procedural or substantive checks would make
the rulemaking process extremely efficient, yet the agency would not be accountable
to the public for its actions. Conversely, requiring an agency to consider all factors
and subjecting its decisionmaking to substantial judicial scrutiny would result in a
high level of political accountability. However, efficiency would undoubtedly
suffer.
157. A new drug is "any drug the composition of which is such that such drug
is not generally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use under the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof." The Federal Food
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 § 201(p)(1), 52 Stat. 1040, 1041-42 (1938).
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entering the market.' The drug approval process was quite long. A
pharmaceutical company had to submit an investigational new drug
application and then undergo three phases of clinical studies. The
time from development of a new drug to its approval by the FDA
could take as long as fifteen years. 159
In order to expedite the drug approval process, Congress enacted
the Food and Drug Modernization Act of 1997 (FDMA).' 6 Section
112 of the FDMA created a fast-track system for the approval of
potentially life-saving drugs. Under section 112, the sponsor of a new
drug requests designation of its product as a "fast track product."' 161
If the drug "is intended for the treatment of a serious or life-
threatening condition and demonstrates the potential to address unmet
medical needs for such a condition," the Secretary is required to
designate the drug as a fast track product and expedite its review.162
C. A Regulatory Fast-Track System
Congress, through the passage of the Modernization Act,
determined that potentially life-saving drugs should be made
available to the general public quickly. Human tissue regulations,
like certain drugs, are potentially life-saving. The risks of
transmitting communicable diseases through tissue transplants can be
significantly reduced when facilities employ the proper testing and
tissue processing procedures. 63 The FDA should have a rulemaking
procedure available to expedite potentially life-saving regulations.
Under a regulatory fast-track system, The Secretary, at the request
of any interested party, would designate regulations as "fast track
regulations" if they would significantly reduce a serious or life-
threatening public health risk and no other current regulations
adequately protect against this risk."6
Fast-track regulations would be exempt from judicial review and
all analytical and procedural requirements imposed by Congress.
Congressional initiatives such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act and
158. See Deborah G.Parver, Expediting the Drug Approval Process: An Analysis
of the FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 1249, 1253 (1999).
159. Id.
160. Food and Drug Association Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
161. Id. § 112(a)(1), 111 Stat. at2309.
162. Id. §112 (a)(1)-(a)(2), 111 Stat. at 2309.
163. See Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues, supra note 7 (statement
of Jesse L. Goodman).
164. The characterization of a regulation as a "fast-track regulation" would
undoubtedly have to be exempt from judicial review. Failure to allow for such an
exemption would destine the regulatory fast-track system to the same fate as the
Good Cause Exception, discussed supra Part V.C. 1.
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the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act require agencies to perform
time and resource-consuming impact statements. The judicial
branch has severely delayed the informal rulemaking process
through the application of the hard-look doctrine. When the public
health is at risk, the need for quick rulemaking outweighs the
possible benefits achieved by these additional requirements.
Attempts to turn the court's "hard look" into a "soft look" would
likely subject the fast-track procedure to new judicial doctrines that
would inevitably slow the proposed rulemaking process. By
removing judicial review completely, the FDA would not be forced
to spend such an inordinate amount of time developing and
maintaining its rulemaking record.
Removal of judicial review and the additional requirements
imposed by Congress would make the fast-track procedure efficient
but largely unaccountable. Thus the FDA still must accept
comments on its proposed rulemaking and respond to all relevant
public comments in its final rule. Maintaining the notice-and-
comment will serve two functions. First, industry involvement in
the rulemaking process will improve the quality of regulations.
Second, requiring the FDA to accept public comment will facilitate
ex-post political oversight of agency decisionmaking. The
responses to public comments in the final rule will create a
rulemaking record-albeit smaller than the rulemaking record
currently required by the hard-look doctrine, If the FDA over-
regulates, the regulated industry will certainly react. Then,
Congress or the President can review agency decisionmaking via the
rulemaking record and use their respective powers to influence
subsequent agency decisionmaking if the FDA is in fact being over-
zealous.
VII. CONCLUSION
Human tissues play a crucial role in medicine. Human tissue
transplants are generally safe as well as effective. Yet, their nature
as a derivative of the human body makes implanted tissues a
potential source of infection. Although the FDA proposed a
comprehensive regulatory program in 1997, six years later the rules
have not been finalized. Currently human tissue banks operate
under little or no government oversight. While many facilities have
voluntarily adopted good tissue practices, some have not. Federal
regulations would significantly reduce the risk of transmittal.
Congress should implement a regulatory fast-track system in order
to streamline the FDA rulemaking process so that rules necessary
for the protection of the public health may be enacted within a
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reasonable time period. Under the proposed fast-track procedure,
the FDA would still be required to accept public comments on its
proposed rulemaking. But many of the additional analytical,
procedural, and substantive requirements imposed on the informal
rulemaking process would be removed so that fast-track regulations
could be promulgated quickly. Michael Leachman*
* J.D./B.C.L. Candidate, May 2005, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University.
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